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INTRODUCTION
Among the many changes wrought by Dodd-Frank was the grant of a signif-
icant but little-noticed power to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) to bring civil enforcement actions against those who make false repre-
sentations to the Agency.! Under the provision, the CFTC can bring an action for
a statement made in any context, and the Commission need not refer the matter
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ iooi, as has traditionally been the practice.2 Nor must the CFTC demonstrate
that the speaker knowingly lied. Instead, the CFTC can bring a false statement
enforcement action subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard, and it
need only prove that the speaker reasonably should have known a statement was
* The author would like to extend special thanks to Professor Kate Stith, Nicholas
McLean, and Jim Williamson for thoughtful discussion on early versions of this
Comment, as well as to Eric Van Nostrand and the editors of the Yale Law & Policy
Review for their insight and excellent advice.
1. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 753, 7
U.S.C. § 9(2) (2012).
2. See Mandy Roth, What's Up at the CFTC?, COMPLIANCEEX (May 4, 2012), http://
compliancex.com/what%E2%8o%99s-up-at-the-cftc ("In the past, the Commission
relied on the criminal agencies to go after liars.").
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false-a power denied to all other financial regulatory agencies, including the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 3 The SEC's former director of en-
forcement, Robert Khuzami, has said in reference to the CFTC's broad new false
statement authority, "Frankly, I wish we had the power the CFTC has." 4
This statutory grant of power, a single sentence amending section 6(c)(2) of
the Commodities Exchange Act,5 was tucked with little fanfare into a small corner
of the Dodd-Frank Act.' Although the provision has gone unnoticed by academic
commentators,7 it has the potential to effect a sea change in the federal financial
regulatory enforcement scheme. With its broad language and scope, sec-
tion 6(c)(2) permits the CFTC to deter individuals and companies from lying to
investigators. But because the statute fails to provide meaningful safeguards
3. See id. ("Significantly, the CFTC, under Dodd-Frank, is now permitted to bring
civil actions against individuals for making false statements to the CFTC, which is
new in the non-criminal enforcement space."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (2006) (per-
mitting civil penalties only for false statements made in certain required reports
filed with the Atomic Energy Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 47126 (2006) (permitting
criminal prosecution under Title 18 for persons who, with intent to defraud the
government, knowingly make false statements to the Secretary of Transportation
only in the context of grants and reports); Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manip-
ulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com mis-
sion, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 24 (2005) ("For example, the [Federal Energy Regulatory]
Commission has no authority to impose a civil penalty on parties that make mate-
rial false statements to the Agency.").
4. Jean Eaglesham, Legal Eagles in Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2012, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052702304868oo457737639197963174o.html.
5. Commodities Exchange Act § 6(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 9(2) (2012). Any discussion of the
CEA would be incomplete if it did not mention the odd fact that the Act permits
the trading of futures in virtually any commodity except onions. 7 U.S.C. § 13-1.
(2012). See Salomon Forex Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 2d 768, 772 (E.D. Va. 1992)
("[V] irtually every conceivable good, article, right, or interest-except onions-is
potentially a commodity within the meaning of the CEA."). The onion provision
has been upheld on rational basis review. Chic. Mercantile Exch. v. Tieken, 178 F.
Supp. 779 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
6. The provision was added as part of a larger amendment introduced by Senator Ma-
ria Cantwell and aimed at expanding the CFTC's ability to combat market manip-
ulation. Neither the floor statements nor the committee nor the conference report
mentions the provision beyond noting its existence. See H.R. REP. No. 111-517 (2010)
(Conf. Rep.) (failing to make any mention of the provision); 156 CONG. REC. S3,347-
48 (daily ed. May 6, 2oo) (statement of Sen. Cantwell introducing and discussing
the amendment).
7. The provision is noted in an online post on the website of the Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. See John H. Sturc, The
Changing Landscape of the CFTC's Enforcement Actions, HARV. L. ScH. F. ON CORP.
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against agency overreach, it illustrates pitfalls that should be avoided in any fu-
ture attempts to grant similar powers to other regulators. While Congress would
do well to heed Khuzami's request and give other regulatory agencies the same
comprehensive authority to bring enforcement actions for false statements, leg-
islators should carefully limit this power through heightened intent requirements
or other safeguards designed to reduce the potential for agency abuse.
In Part I, I begin by examining the scope of section 6(c)(2) and its much-
needed enhancement of the CFTC's regulatory flexibility. I demonstrate that the
provision is a significant departure from the existing regulatory framework: the
law provides for liability for a wider range of statements; permits the CFTC to
pursue actions without meeting the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; does not require referral to the DOJ; and specifies a mens rea standard of
mere negligence. These developments permit the CFTC to incentivize truth-tell-
ing and to punish those who engage in cover-ups of wrongful activity.
In Part 1l, I explore the provision's dark side by comparing it to 18 U.S.C.
§ iooi, the federal false statement statute, in order to demonstrate that sec-
tion 6(c)(2) lacks necessary safeguards and is open to significant agency abuse.
While section iool has itself been criticized by academics and judges for being
overbroad and subject to prosecutorial abuse, section 6(c)(2) goes significantly
further in both respects. The potential for abuse is further illustrated by a recent
CFTC enforcement action against a clerical worker, which shows that even a wit-
ness who is not charged with other unlawful activity and who corrects her false
statements in the course of a single interview can face significant liability.
Finally, in Part III, I survey several adjustments that could be made to the
provision in order to prevent abuse and facilitate the grant of this power (with
appropriate safeguards) to other regulators. These changes-many of them
drawn from academic work on section iooi-include the resurrection of an "ex-
culpatory no" doctrine to limit the types of statements that could give rise to lia-
bility, as well as a heightened mens rea requirement that would protect speakers
who did not knowingly lie or recklessly disregard the truth.
I. A NEW TOOL: THE CONTOURS OF SECTION 6(c)(2)
The amended section 6(c)(2) of the Commodities Exchange Act makes it un-
lawful "for any person to make any false or misleading statement of a material
fact to the Commission."' Under the provision, the false statement could, but
need not, occur in the context of a registration application or a report filed with
the Commission.9 And the misstatement need not be willful-the CFTC must
only prove that the individual "knew or reasonably should have known" that a
statement was inaccurate.o The breadth of the provision is particularly striking
when contrasted with existing civil false statement provisions, which prohibit
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false statements only in narrowly cabined areas: employing deceptive devices via
interstate mail in connection with the purchase of securities," making false state-
ments in connection with swap agreements," or making false reports to manip-
ulate the price of commodities. 3 Furthermore, the Commission itself has the
power to bring an enforcement action against any person it believes has violated
this provision, without referring the matter to the DOJ for criminal prosecu-
tion.14 The scope of this power is broad. As the CFTC itself has stated, section
6(c)(2) "expands the prohibition against false statements made in registration
applications or reports filed with the Commission to include any statement of
material fact made to the Commission in any context."" After proving that the
defendant made false statements, the CFTC may revoke or suspend the defend-
ant's registration with the Agency or assess substantial civil monetary penalties--
as much as $140,000, or triple the monetary gain from the violation, for each false
statement.'6 The provision thus enables the CFTC to take independent action to
punish a vast swathe of behavior-lies in any form-that previously lay outside
its jurisdiction and could be pursued only by a referral to the DOJ.
A. The Scope of the Transformation
The new section 6(c)(2) works a significant change in the CFTC's regulatory
regime. First, as noted above, the provision broadens the scope of statements that
can give rise to civil liability-false statements made to the CFTC in any context
are now actionable." Second, the provision permits the CFTC to bring a false
statement enforcement action itself rather than referring alleged violations to the
DOJ for criminal prosecution. Third and relatedly, because section 6(c)(2) au-
thorizes civil enforcement actions rather than criminal prosecutions, the CFTC
need only prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Fourth, the provi-
sion allows the CFTC to succeed in an enforcement action if it can prove that a
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (b) (2012).
12. Id. § 78i.
13. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012).
14. Id. § 13a-i.
15. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398 (July
14, 2011).
16. See7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8(a)(1)(ii) (2012) (outlining monetary penal-
ties). In a case under the related provision of 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(4) (2012), which deals
with false statements made to registered futures associations, one court imposed a
penalty of $1,910,ooo, which it calculated as being twice the amount of the defend-
ants' gains from the false statements. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Angus Jackson, Inc., No. 12-cv-60450, 2013 WL 320185, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,2013).
17. Before the passage of Dodd-Frank, § 6(c) prohibited only false statements made in
applications and reports to the Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2oo6).
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speaker "reasonably should have known" that a statement was false, even if the
speaker did not have actual knowledge and did not recklessly disregard the
truth.'8
In order to appreciate the scope of the change, it is helpful to examine the
CFTC's enforcement options before the passage of Dodd-Frank. Before sec-
tion 6(c)(2) was amended, false statements made to the CFTC in most contexts
could be addressed only through criminal prosecution under the False Statement
Act, 18 U.S.C. § ool. That statute makes it a federal crime to "knowingly and
willfully" make "any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or repre-
sentation" in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the
United States.'9 The government famously utilized section iool in the prosecu-
tion of Martha Stewart, who in 2004 was convicted of making false statements to
the SEC and FBI.2 o
Under the pre-Dodd-Frank regime, investigation subjects were rarely pun-
ished for lying to regulators, as several structural features of section iool tend to
preclude prosecutions for all but the most extreme violations of the law. First,
under section looi, the CFTC cannot itself initiate an action based upon a de-
fendant's false statements; instead, it is forced to refer violations to the DOJ or a
U.S. Attorney's Office for criminal prosecution. And because a violation of sec-
tion iooi is a criminal offense, the government is required to prove its case be-
yond a reasonable doubt. This state of affairs means that prosecutions under sec-
tion iooi are only brought for violations that are (a) so severe as to convince the
DOJ that they warrant the expenditure of its own resources based on a referral
from the CFTC, and (b) so clear as to be provable beyond a reasonable doubt.
Historically, this has meant that such prosecutions were almost never brought.
As representatives of the CFTC are reported to have recently stated, most "cases
of false information or testimony to the Commission are too 'piddly' (i.e., not
substantial enough) to refer to the criminal agencies. The standard of proof re-
quired at the criminal agencies is too high and the penalties too low."2 1 This is
still the state of affairs at the SEC and other similar regulatory agencies."
18. Before amendment, § 6(c) prohibited only "willfully" made statements or omis-
sions. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1oo (2006).
20. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F-3d 273, 281 (2d Cir. 2006).
21. See Roth, supra note 2 (summarizing panel discussion with representatives of the
SEC and CFTC).
22. See David R. Chase & Neal Wilson, When the SEC Comes Knocking: What to Do
When Faced with an "Enforcement Investigation," Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 2000,
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/bltoomay-sec.html (discussing the SEC's
options for pursuing false statements, such as referral to DOJ for prosecution under
section iool or provision criminalizing obstruction of justice, but failing to mention
any comprehensive civil false statement authority). But see Stewart, 433 F.3d at 281
(upholding conviction of defendant for making false statements to SEC represent-
atives as well as FBI agents); United States v. Hirst, No. CR 11-0157 SBA, 2012 WL
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Section 6(c)(2) grants the CFTC significantly more flexibility than sec-
tion ooi, and accordingly can be more easily used by the Commission to deter
lying and punish otherwise untouchable defendants. First, the mens rea require-
ments for section 6(c)(2) are significantly lower than those of section looi. Sec-
tion iool requires a defendant to make a false statement "knowingly and will-
fully" 2 3 -that is to say that the defendant must have known the statement was
false and intended to deceive. 4 Even 7 U.S.C. § 13(a), which permits the CFTC to
bring an enforcement action against those who make false statements to self-reg-
ulatory entities and boards of trade, requires "willful" falsification or "knowing"
misstatement." By contrast, the CFTC may commence an enforcement action
under section 6(c)(2) whenever a defendant "knew, or reasonably should have
known" that the statement was false or misleading. 6 This significantly reduces
the challenges faced by the Commission, which can succeed in an enforcement
action without inquiring into the subjective state of mind of the defendant.
Furthermore, unlike a criminal proceeding in which the government must
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, CFTC enforcement actions employ
only a "preponderance of the evidence" standard." This is not, in itself, surpris-
ing: preponderance of the evidence is the default standard in civil actions.2' But,
3583044 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012) (charging defendant with making false statements
to IRS officers).
23. See18 U.S.C. § iooi(a) (2012); United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155,159 (2d Cir. 2004).
24. See United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977) (" [T]he term 'knowingly
and wilfully' as used in relation to the making of a statement means the statement
must have been made voluntarily, deliberately, and intentionally, and with
knowledge of its contents and falsity of its contents as distinguished from the mak-
ing of a false statement by inadvertence, mistake, carelessness or for any other in-
nocent reason.").
25. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012); Complaint at 58, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. iFinix Futures, Inc., No. 12-cv-4843 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012) (alleging
that false statements made to a self-regulatory agency were made "knowingly and
willfully" and thus violated § 13(a)(4)).
26. Commodities Exchange Act § 6(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 9(2) (2012).
27. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 1oo (2d Cir.
2000) (affirming district court which had employed preponderance of the evidence
standard); In re Bielfeldt, CFTC Docket No. 96-1, 2004 WL 2785293, at *11 (C.F.T.C.
2004) ("The Division must prove the allegations of a complaint by a preponderance
of the evidence."). A preponderance of the evidence standard generally requires
finding that "the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexist-
ence." Neil Orloff& Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983).
28. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (noting that pre-
ponderance of the evidence is the typical standard in civil suits for money damages,
fraud actions and administrative proceedings before the SEC, and private actions
under the securities laws); Orloff& Stedinger, supra note 27, at 1159.
340
32: 335 2013
REGULATORY LIES AND SECTION 6(c)(2)
as I discuss below, in conjunction with the lowered mens rea requirements and
the ability to independently pursue false statement violations, the reduced bur-
den of proof dramatically expands the CFTC's enforcement options.
B. Section 6(c)(2) Provides Deterrence and Much-Needed Enforcement Flexi-
bility
Section 6(c)(2) is therefore a powerful tool indeed. To succeed in an enforce-
ment action under the provision, the CFTC must merely prove (1) by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, 9 that a person (2) made a material false or misleading
statement 30 (3) to the Commission, and that the person (4) reasonably should
have known the statement was false .3'The statement can have been made at any
time, and the defendant need not have been under oath; indeed, the defendant
need not even have been the subject of an investigation.
The provision will encourage investigation subjects and potential witnesses
to tell the truth and disincentivize lying to the CFTC.32 Before the passage of
Dodd-Frank, an investigation subject could feel far more comfortable fudging
the truth in an interview with the CFTC, as any misstatement would have to be
so severe as to warrant referral to the DOJ and the expenditure of scarce prose-
cutorial resources in a separate criminal action. The violation would also have to
be sufficiently obvious to allow the DOJ to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the subject knowingly and willfully lied. But under the amended sec-
tion 6(c)(2), the making of false statements can easily lead to the addition of an-
other charge in an enforcement action, putting potential liars on notice that even
smaller and less clear-cut lapses in truth telling could come back to haunt them.
Investigation subjects will also be more likely to do their homework before mak-
ing statements, as a subject may be held liable for statements she "reasonably
should have known" were false-even if those statements are made casually.33
And charges under section 6(c) (2) can simply be added to a complaint if wrong-
doers attempt to frustrate the CFTC's investigations, allowing the Commission
to easily increase the penalties for investigation subjects who attempt to obstruct
29. See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text.
30. That is, the statement must have "a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable
of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (quoting Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)).
31. See Commodities Exchange Act § 6(c)(2).
32. See Alexandra Bak-Boychuk, Liar Laws: How MPC § 241.3 and State Unsworn Falsi-
fication Statutes Fix the Flaws in the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § oo2), 78 TEMP.
L. REV. 453, 481 (2005) (emphasizing the incentives created by false statement pro-
hibitions that "[u]ltimately encourage[] people to tell the truth").
33. See Commodities Exchange Act § 6(c)(2).
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its activities. Indeed the CFTC has been employing precisely this strategy, adding
section 6(c)(2) charges to a variety of enforcement actions.34
The CFTC has publicly recognized the scope and power of the new tools pro-
vided by Dodd-Frank. David Meister, former Director of Enforcement at the
CFTC, has stated that the new false-statement provision is one of a "number of
new tools and we are pleased with that and we will use these tools in the most
efficient way possible to enforce the Dodd-Frank Act."3 5 After one successful false
statement action, Meister stated, "When a witness walks into CFTC testimony he
or she should plan to tell the truth to every question or face the consequences.
We will use the new Dodd-Frank false statements provision ... to make sure it is
well understood that lying is not an option."3' The Commission's actions have
borne out Meister's confidence: in fiscal year 2012, the CFTC brought 102 en-
forcement actions, the largest number in years, and initiated more than 350 new
investigations-among the largest crop in the CFTC's history.37
Several recent enforcement actions reveal the possible utility of the new pro-
vision. CFTC v. Newell,38 for instance, demonstrates the CFTC's ability to in-
crease penalties for investigation subjects who make false statements to hide their
unlawful activity from the Commission. The underlying charge in the case was
that Donald Newell and his fund engaged in a scheme to place commodity trades
without specifying for which account the trades were intended, in violation of
CFTC regulations. After placing the trades, Newell would wait to see whether the
trade was profitable before allocating it either to the company's proprietary ac-
34. See Complaint at if 90-99, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. MF Global,
No. 13-cv-4463 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013); Amended Complaint at ! 114-20, Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Arista LLC, No. 12-cv-9043 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
2013).
35. See Broadcast Transcript, Bingham Presents 2on: Enforcement After Dodd-Frank
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/programs/bingham/.
36. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Futures Broker Employee Susan Butterfield to
Pay $5o,ooo Penalty in Settlement of Charges of Making False Statements to the
CFTC During Her Investigative Testimony (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6693-13.
37. See John H. Sturc & Jeffrey L. Steiner, Expanded Authority, Increasing Numbers and
Record Fines: The Changing Landscape of the CFTC's Enforcement Actions,
GIBSONDUNN 1 (2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
ChangingLandscape-CFTC-Enforcement-Actions.pdf (collecting CFTC enforce-
ment statistics); Scott D. O'Malia, Comm'r, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, Keynote Address at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Society Annual Semi-
nar: CFTC's Implementation of Dodd-Frank: Grading Agency Transparency (Mar.
19, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-22.
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count (if it was highly profitable) or to the customer accounts (if it was less prof-
itable)-thereby fraudulently earning a profit of up to $1.1 million for the com-
pany at the expense of its customers.39
The false statement charges against Newell arose from his attempts to conceal
this activity. Once the investigation into his company was underway, Newell
stated in sworn testimony that "he always, or almost always, provided the Pro-
prietary Account numbers when entering orders for that account by telephone,"
whereas in fact he "rarely, if ever, provided a specific account number when he
called [the] trade-desk to initiate trades." 4o
Newell makes clear the importance of section 6(c)(2)'S mens rea standard.
The CFTC, in accordance with the provision's requirements, alleged only that
"Newell knew or should have known these statements were false or misleading."4'
In other words, the CFTC did not aim to demonstrate that Newell made the state-
ments with the intention to deceive the Commission. And because success on the
underlying fraud charge requires proving that Newell did not provide account
numbers when placing trades, if the CFTC proves fraud it will almost certainly
also succeed on its false statement claim as well. By including a charge under sec-
tion 6(c)(2), the CFTC therefore has an easy method to punish Newell for his
attempt to hide his activities, while also making clear to future investigation sub-
jects that lies and misstatements will not be tolerated.
One of the CFTC's highest-profile cases, the investigation into MF Global
and former New Jersey governor Jon Corzine, also relied heavily on false state-
ment charges under section 6(c)(2).4' At the heart of that case was the allegation
that MF Global had improperly used customers' segregated accounts. The
CFTC's complaint included four counts, one of which accused MF Global of vi-
olating section 6(c)(2). The CFTC alleged that MF Global had filed multiple false
reports with the Commission which misstated the funds' use of customer ac-
counts. 4 3 The case ultimately settled, with MF Global ordered to pay more than
one billion dollars in restitution and one hundred million dollars in civil penal-
ties."4 Although the penalty was not apportioned by violation, the final consent
order specified that MF Global was liable for violating section 6(c) (2).45 The pro-
vision worked perfectly, as MF Global was punished not only for its underlying
wrongful behavior but also for attempting to hide that behavior from the CFTC.
And because it is far easier to show that figures in reports are false than to prove
39. See Complaint at !5 14-32, Newell, 2012 WL 3620355 (No. 12-cv-o6763) (Aug. 23,
2012).
40. Id. at 55 65-66.
41. Id. at 1 67.
42. See Complaint, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. MF Global, No. 13-cv-
4463 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013).
43. See id. at 55 90-99.
44. See Final Consent Order, MF Global (No. 13-cv-4463) (June 27, 2013).
45. See id. at Part III, 5 3.
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complex financial fraud, section 6(c)(2) provides a safe fallback for the CFTC if
its underlying charges failed.
Section 6(c)(2) even allows the CFTC to punish and deter false statements
after legal proceedings have begun. In one recent case, the CFTC amended its
complaint to add false statement charges based on alleged misrepresentations
contained in a letter submitted by defendants' counsel to the CFTC.46 This was
so even though the CFTC did not allege that counsel had filed the statements with
the intent to deceive or that the statements caused harm or actually deceived the
Commission.47 By employing section 6(c)(2) in this manner, the CFTC sends a
powerful signal to attorneys and their clients that it will not tolerate inaccuracies
and misstatements.48
II. HIDDEN DANGERS AND THE PARALLELS TO SECTION 1001
The potential reach of section 6(c)(2) is particularly striking, given that many
courts and commentators have criticized the breadth of the far more conservative
provisions of section iool.49 Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit, hardly a judi-
cial firebrand, recently noted the ever-increasing scope of false statement prose-
cutions and warned that "section iooi prosecutions can pose a risk of abuse and
injustice."50 The media has picked up the theme, with commentators fretting that
prosecutors use the statute "to beef up weak indictments," in many cases,5' and
46. See Amended Complaint at 1 116-20, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Arista, No. 12-cv-9043 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013).
47. The Amended Complaint merely alleges that the defendants "knew or reasonably
should have known" that the statements in counsel's letter were false. Id. at 5 58.
48. Other recent false statement cases include Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Optiver, No. o8-Civ-656o (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012); Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Peregrine Financial Group, 12-cv-5383 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2013); and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Growth Capital Management, No. to-
cv-1473 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2012).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's interpretation of section iooi as making "a surprisingly
broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law"); John H.F. Shat-
tuck & David E. Landau, Civil Liberties and Criminal Code Reform, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 914, 944-45 (1981); Steven R. Morrison, When Is Lying Illegal? When
Should It Be? A Critical Analysis of the Federal False Statements Act, 43 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 111, 112 (2009) (collecting critical commentary). More radically, some phi-
losophers of punishment have questioned the legitimacy of criminalizing false
statement where no harm has actually been done. See, e.g., 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 37 (1990).
50. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concur-
ring).




REGULATORY LIES AND SECTION 6(c)(2)
observing that the statute is the tool prosecutors turn to "when all else fails."52
One academic commentator worries that investigators "need only informally ap-
proach the suspect and elicit a false reply and they are assured of conviction with
a harsh penalty even if they are unable to prove the underlying substantive
crime."" In the Martha Stewart case, for example, some observers claimed that
prosecutors brought charges under section iool only when they were unable to
make their initial case. 4 One conviction under section ooi-overturned by the
Eleventh Circuit-was even more egregious: a notary, who had failed to comply
with state law requiring her to notarize only documents that were signed in front
of her, was prosecuted after falsely telling an IRS agent that she had complied
with this requirement in notarizing a particular document." In another case, a
government employee was successfully prosecuted for falsely denying having ever
been a member of the Communist Party in an informal interview.5' Even a Su-
preme Court Justice has worried about the statute's scope. Justice Ginsburg has
wondered about "the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has
conferred on prosecutors to manufacture crimes" via the statute.57
These concerns regarding the scope of section iooi motivated the formula-
tion of an "exculpatory no" doctrine by several circuit courts, which held that an
individual's false denial of guilt to federal agents (simply saying "no, I didn't do
it") does not violate the statute.58 The doctrine was meant to avoid criminalizing
a defendant's protestation of innocence, which courts felt was an unavoidable
outgrowth of human nature, as well as constitutionally protected by the Fifth
Amendment.59 Despite this rationale, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected
the "exculpatory no" doctrine in Brogan v. United States, reasoning that the plain
text of the statute criminalized even "mere" denials of guilt."o But despite the
statute's plain language, Justices Souter and Ginsburg wrote to emphasize the
52. Paul Glastris, "False Statements": The Flubber ofAll Laws, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 22, 1998, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/98033o/archive
003547.htm.
53. William J. Schwartz, Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal
False Statement Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 316, 325-26 (1977).
54. See Safire, supra note 51.
55. United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986).
56. Marzani v. United States, 168 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
57. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment).
58. See id. at 401-05 (majority opinion) (summarizing "exculpatory no" doctrine and
cases); Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (applying doctrine to overturn the conviction of a notary
who had, in conversation with an IRS agent, falsely denied employing improper
notarizing procedure); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1960).
59. See, e.g., Tabor, 788 F.2d at 717-19.
60. 522 U.S. at 400-01.
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dangers of prosecutorial overreach and to urge Congress to amend the law (two
other justices dissented on the grounds that Congress did not intend to criminal-
ize the "exculpatory no").' Even after Brogan, the courts continue to adopt stat-
utory constructions to narrow what would otherwise be virtually unlimited pros-
ecutorial discretion."2 And yet, as discussed above, section iooi actually provides
significantly more safeguards than section 6(c)(2). This should be, to say the least,
cause for concern.
As discussed above, a host of academics and commentators have criticized
the government's use of section iooi, claiming the statute has become "a bedrock
of the federal process crimes charging practices, and that there is at the very least
a perception that some of those charges are pretextual and that some are retrib-
utive, in the sense that the government pursues persons who have not broken any
laws."63 If prosecutors have overreached in their use of section iooi, how much
more will regulators be tempted to abuse the laxer standards of section 6(c)(2)?
What is to stop the CFTC from seeking to elicit a false statement from a defendant
in order to compel a guilty plea on underlying substantive charges, or dispensing
with substantive charges in favor of the easier-to-prove false statement claims?6 4
The extraordinary breadth of section 6(c)(2) can be glimpsed in the recent
Butterfield action.6 1 In that case, the CFTC interviewed Susan Butterfield in con-
nection with her employment at a company registered with the Commission.
Butterfield told her CFTC interviewers she had never "pre-stamped" order tickets
(which undermines the reliability of audit trails). In the course of that same in-
terview, Butterfield was confronted with evidence that she had in fact pre-
stamped tickets, and she recanted her earlier testimony.6' Despite the fact that
she recanted her testimony in the same interview, and the fact that the CFTC did
61. See id. at 408-18 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 418-21 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(noting that a "fundamentally ambiguous" question cannot form the basis for a
false statement prosecution); United States v. Gatewood, 173 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding that government must negate "any reasonable interpretation that
would make the defendant's statement factually correct"). See generally Todd S. Ku-
rihara & Kenneth T. Whang, False Statements and False Claims, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
491, 503-04 (2007) (collecting judicially devised defenses to section looi).
63. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1468 (2009).
64. See id. at 1495.
65. Order Imposing Sanctions, In re Butterfield, CFTC Docket No. 13-33 (Sept. 16,
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents
/Ilegalpleading/enfbutterfieldordero916l3.pdf.
66. See id. at 2-4.
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not charge or prove that her underlying behavior was illegal,6 7 Butterfield even-
tually settled the false statement action for $50,000. One trade blog examining
the case noted that Butterfield was not the target of a fraud investigation and that
her false statements never actually misled the CFTC's investigators, prompting
the commentators to ask whether the provision's use in this case was justifiable."
The settlement sum in Butterfield was relatively small, but the fact that it was lev-
ied on a clerical worker-who recanted her testimony in the same interview in
which she made the false statements69-demonstrates the striking power of sec-
tion 6(c)(2) and should make us wary of the law's potential applications.
III. MOVING FORWARD: THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITING PRINCIPLE
At a 2012 conference, the CFTC's Director of Enforcement was asked how
the CFTC would protect against abuse of its new false statement authority.7 0 He
reportedly answered that the CFTC exercises discretion "all the time" and that he
trusts in the professionalism of his staff.7' But given what we have seen of sec-
tion 6(c)(2)'s breadth (and the example of section looi), some external limiting
principle seems necessary. Happily, there are several such principles available.
This Comment will briefly review several such principles without arguing for
their relative attractiveness, before arguing that, at the least, Congress should
heighten the provision's mens rea requirement so as to avoid penalizing individ-
uals who unknowingly misstate a fact to the Commission.
Much scholarship has sought to cabin the reach of section loot to conduct
that is appropriately criminalized.7 2 This scholarship could profitably be applied
to revising section 6(c)(2) and designing future provisions granting similar false
statement authority to other regulatory agencies. For instance, one author has
67. The consent order states only that pre-stamping tickets "may constitute a violation
of Commission Regulations . . . and may facilitate unlawful trade allocation
schemes." Id. at 2. (emphasis added).
68. See Daniel Nathan & Jeremy Ben Merkelson, The CFTC Charges Civil Perjury, Even
After the Witness Comes Clean, BD/IA REGULATOR (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www
.bdiaregulator.com/2013/o9/the-cftc-charges- civil-perjury-even-after- the-witness
-comes-clean.
69. Admittedly, Butterfield recanted her story only after being confronted with con-
trary evidence. But there is nothing in the law that would obviously prevent false
statement charges even if she had unilaterally recanted without such evidence.
70. See Roth, supra note 2.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Bak-Boychuk, supra note 32, at 473 (describing various judicial strategies
for limiting section iool); Morrison, supra note 49; Schwartz, supra note 53 (arguing
that subjects of investigation should not be targeted by section iooi because of the
possibility of prosecutorial abuse, but that witnesses who make false statements
may properly be targeted).
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followed the lead of some courts in suggesting that false statements given volun-
tarily and not made under oath should not be criminalized under section iooi, as
these are not statements the law was meant to target.73 Congress might apply this
reasoning to limit the scope of section 6(c)(2). Alternatively, the provision's
scope could be restricted to statements that are "active, positive, and aggressive
lies made to the government, at the statement-maker's initiation, in order to ob-
tain some benefit." 4 Or the "exculpatory no" doctrine, dismantled in the section
iooi context by Brogan, could be resurrected in the section 6(c)(2) context. 5
At the very least, Congress should heighten the mens rea requirements for
section 6(c)(2). While the current language relieves the CFTC of the difficult job
of proving that an individual knew he was lying, it also exposes individuals to
significant liability for voluntarily attempting to offer the Commission infor-
mation the individual believes is true. Under the statute as written, a momentary
slip of the tongue, or even a fleeting bout of forgetfulness, can create massive civil
liability. A simple hypothetical illustrates the dangers of the current mens rea
standards. Suppose the Commission asks a businesswoman on what day her part-
ner executed a certain transaction. Her calendar shows that the transaction oc-
curred last Tuesday, and she should therefore reasonably know that information,
but for some reason she forgets and states that it occurred on Wednesday. As-
suming the context is such that the misstatement is material (perhaps, unbe-
knownst to the businesswoman, the culpability of her partner turns on the date
the transaction was executed), the businesswoman has just unintentionally vio-
lated section 6(c)(2).76 And as Butterfield indicates, the businesswoman may not
be able to remedy the violation even by correcting herself in the same interview.
73. See Morrison, supra note 49, at 115. Morrison cites a number of decisions reaching
this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1no9, 1110 ( 9th Cir. 1972)
(defendant giving a false name to the FBI "was not within the class of false state-
ments that section iool was designed to proscribe"); United States v. Ehrlichman,
379 F. Supp. 291, 291-92 (D.D.C. 1974) ("Congress did not intend that [the provi-
sion] be applied to statements given to the F.B.I. voluntarily and without oath or
verbatim transcription during an interview initiated by the Bureau in the course of
a criminal investigation."); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D. Md.
1955) ("[T]he legislative intent in the use of the word 'statement' does not fairly
apply .. .where the defendants did not volunteer any statement or representation
for the purpose of making claim upon or inducing improper action by the govern-
ment against others. . . ."); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 89 (D. Colo. 1953)
(concluding that it does not violate section iool "to intentionally fail to tell the truth
to any investigator of any agency of the United States" when "under no legal obli-
gation to speak").
74. See Morrison, supra note 49, at 138-39.
75. Because Brogan was a statutory interpretation case limited to section iool, it is of
course not binding in the section 6(c)(2) context. And Congress is free to simply
amend the provision to make clear that it does not apply to "exculpatory nos."
76. In fact, the CFTC must only prove that the preponderance of the evidence indicates
that the transaction had occurred on Tuesday.
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Congress might therefore consider mirroring the mens rea requirements of sec-
tion iool by requiring the CFTC to prove that a defendant knowingly and will-
fully made false statements.? While this would make the CFTC's job harder in
some instances-and perhaps detract from the deterrence benefits provided by
the provision-these sacrifices are justified by the importance of preventing
agency overreach.
CONCLUSION
Section 6(c)(2) attempts to remedy a very real gap in the regulatory enforce-
ment scheme. But in doing so, the provision fails to provide minimal safeguards
to prevent abuse of discretion and over-enforcement. The pendulum has swung
too far. Despite these failings, at least one former SEC official has suggested that
that agency would like false statement authority comparable to that of the
CFTC.78 Congress has not yet demonstrated any intention of granting other reg-
ulatory agencies such authority, but given the significant benefits that section
6(c)(2) provides, such a request is not outlandish. Congress should consider
granting other regulatory agencies the power to pursue persons who make false
representations, but this power should be cabined by appropriately high mens
rea standards (and perhaps other safeguards surveyed above). While this Com-
ment has attempted to briefly sketch several plausible limiting principles, more
undoubtedly exist. The present moment-when this new power is still in its in-
fancy and before it has been granted to other agencies-is the time for courts,
academics, and legislators to consider how best to share the provision's benefits
with other agencies while instituting reasonable safeguards against government
abuse.
77. Under established precedent, this standard also encompasses liability for reckless
disregard of the truth, so that the CFTC would not need to prove actual knowledge
in every case. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1977)
(collecting cases for the proposition that "reckless disregard for the truthfulness of
the statement" satisfies a "knowingly and willfully" mens rea standard); see also
United States v. London, 66 F.3 d 1227, 1241-42 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
78. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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